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Europeanization and the Soft-Law Process of EU Corporate Governance: how has the 
2003 Action Plan impacted on national corporate governance codes? 
 
Abstract 
This study explores Europeanization, the interrelationship between domestic and EU-level 
policy activity. Specifically, it asks how domestic policy is affected by EU-level (soft-law) 
policy processes. This contrasts with the hard-law focus of most Europeanization research. 
Our empirical analysis seeks to determine the extent to which the European Commission’s 
2003 plan to enhance corporate governance delivered on its aim of ‘co-ordinating corporate 
governance efforts of member states’. This study thus differs from most others on 
convergence in corporate governance regimes, which look for evidence of convergence per 
se, rather than convergence towards a specified set of principles. Applying content analysis 
and econometric tests to 95 corporate governance codes issued between 1992 and mid-2010, 
we find that the Action Plan has influenced member states’ corporate governance policies. 
However, the degree of national policy alignment to the Action Plan’s priorities depends on 
when the corporate governance code was issued, where, and by whom. 
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Introduction 
European Union (EU) membership impacts on the member states in numerous ways. 
Europeanization is a term which, in essence, describes two features of countries’ 
membership of the EU – the process by which EU decision-making manifests itself at the 
national level; and the outcomes of EU decision-making. Whilst this might imply a top-down 
process, the centrality of the member states in EU decision-making means that 
Europeanization can result in member states’ pre-existing domestic policy and institutional 
preferences reflected at the EU level (see, inter alia, Cowles et al., 2001; Featherstone and 
Radaelli, 2003; and a summary in Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006, pp. 332-333). 
 
Despite the recent expansion in research on Europeanization, much of it is still, albeit often 
implicitly, concerned with hard law. Yet over the same timeframe, ongoing EU integration 
have resulted in greater diversity in what constitutes EU decision-making. In particular, there 
has been a growth in soft law processes, manifested in particular through the open method of 
coordination (OMC). Here, there is no legal obligation to implement EU ‘policy’ 
domestically, because the EU process has not yielded any specific hard law to transpose 
(Saurugger, 2012). That said, soft law and the OMC are still intended to deliver policy 
change at the member state level (Trubek and Trubek, 2005). Our attention in the present 
paper is thus directed at this relatively underdeveloped area of the Europeanization literature. 
This provides the motivation for our over-arching research question: how is domestic policy 
affected by EU-level (soft-law) policy processes? 
 
In our research we deliberately absent ourselves from hard-law areas of the Europeanization 
literature, such as compliance. Our empirical attention analyzes developments in EU 
corporate governance policy. We utilize a unique dataset of national corporate governance 
codes issued over the period 1992 to (mid) 2010, extracted from a detailed content analysis 
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of 95 relevant national documents. A range of quantitative techniques are then used to 
determine whether and how the European Commission’s 2003 Communication 
‘Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union – 
A Plan to Move Forward’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2003), impacted on 
domestic corporate governance policy-making. This Communication includes both hard law 
and soft law. Because our interest is exclusively in the soft law elements, we refer 
hereinafter to this Communication as the Action Plan. This is the title of the section (from 
page 10) which sets out a road-map to for ‘fostering efficiency and competitiveness of 
business, and strengthening shareholders rights and third parties protection’ (page 3), and 
where the soft law elements are primarily located. 
 
Our data period is longer than that of earlier papers, as discussed below. This allows us to 
explore a range of empirical issues related to the impact of the 2003 Action Plan, expressed 
as specific research questions. Is there evidence that the Action Plan affected member states’ 
corporate governance policy-making? Were policy responses coming from actors other than 
government and, if so, did this affect the nature of those policy responses? Were some 
member states more responsive to EU discussions than others? 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section I, we outline the relevant literatures on 
Europeanization, soft law and the OMC, and corporate governance policy. Section II 
describes the data and research design. Section III presents the data analysis, whilst Section 
IV concludes, offering suggestions for future directions research can take. 
 
I. Literature Review 
Europeanization ‘is a process of change affecting domestic institutions, politics and public 
policy. Change occurs when political behaviour at the European Union (EU) level has a 
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transformative effect on domestic political behaviour.’ (Radaelli, 2012, p. 1). This captures 
both the process and outcome elements of Europeanization. Moreover Europeanization, so 
defined, can manifest itself in countries other than EU members, whether they be applicants 
(as we shall see later), or non-member, non-applicant countries having a formal relationship 
with the EU, such as the three non-EU members of the European Economic Area. 
 
Egan (2012, p. xi) identifies three ‘waves’ of Europeanization research, from ‘institutional 
adaptation to membership’; to the ‘structural changes to domestic political systems that can 
be attributed to European integration’; to a ‘third wave’ which goes beyond ‘administrative 
and institutional adaptation’ to include work on ‘transnationalism, partisan politics and party 
cleavages, as well as good governance and conditionality.’ This last wave  is ‘more 
conscious of the political contestation that affects Europeanization as well as the contestation 
and oppositional responses to Europeanization which constrain the role and actions of the 
European Union (EU).’ The growing range of EU-level institutional processes reflects, in 
part, this contestation as the numbers of member states, opinions, and areas of common 
policy interest have grown. 
 
All three of Egan’s ‘waves’ of Europeanization research relate to ‘positive integration’, 
whereby member states agree common laws and policies. But a distinction can be drawn 
between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ processes. Egan’s first two waves represent top-down 
processes. To an extent this is inevitable as member states have adapted what they do 
domestically, to collective policy-making within the EU. Yet even under the ordinary 
legislative procedure, member states are central to decision-making processes. This provides 
them with many opportunities to influence decision-making at the EU level. Thus we 
witness both ‘Europeanization and domestication’ (Bugdahn, 2005, p. 177). 
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One important development has been the introduction of the soft-law process of the OMC. 
This ‘bottom-up’ process has facilitated the discussion and coordination of policy areas that 
are of common interest, but which are deemed unsuitable for discussion under the ordinary 
legislative procedure – typically because of their domestic political sensitivity (Sabel and 
Zeitlin, 2008 talk of ‘experimentalist governance’). The OMC is based on a three-step 
process: 
 
• ‘Jointly identifying and defining objectives to be achieved (adopted by the Council); 
• jointly established measuring instruments (statistics, indicators, guidelines); 
• benchmarking, ie comparison of the Member States’ performance and exchange of best 
practices (monitored by the Commission).’1 
 
The OMC is most closely identified with policy-making in the social and employment 
spheres, especially from 2000 with the establishment of the Lisbon Strategy (Heidenreich 
and Bischoff, 2008; Rhodes, 2010). That said, features such as benchmarking are seen before 
then, notably in the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines from 1993 (Deroose et al., 2008); 
and the European Employment Strategy, established in 1997. The OMC offers a third way of 
policy-making, between ‘centralised harmonisation’ and ‘mutual recognition or regulatory 
competition’ (Ashiagbor, 2004, p. 305; de la Rosa, 2005, p. 19), approaches which are not 
inevitably in opposition (Deakin, 2009, p. 229). 
 
Moreover, Kay and Ackrill (2007) argue that there is evidence of convergence between the 
regulatory state and liberal-intergovernmental conceptions of the EU. They highlight the 
work of, respectively, Majone (see, inter alia, Majone, 1994; 1999) and Moravcsik (see, 
                                                          
1 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/open_method_coordination_en.htm, Europa Glossary of 
Terms, last accessed 30 January 2015. 
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inter alia, Moravcsik, 1993; 2002). This combines notions of an EU-level decision-making 
process, but one which is still dominated by member states. 
 
In the present paper, we seek to analyze how such experimentalist governance is influencing 
domestic policy-making, with a particular focus on EU efforts to deliver greater co-
ordination of national corporate governance codes. Corporate governance is ‘the system by 
which companies are directed and controlled’ (Cadbury, 1992, quoted in Commission of the 
European Communities, 2003, p. 10). Corporate governance policy addresses ‘the problems 
that result from the separation of ownership and control, and addresses in particular the 
principal-agent relationship between shareholders and directors’ (European Commission, 
2003, p. 10). Those ‘problems that result’ have been seen globally and have included, in 
recent years, the collapse Enron (in 2001), Worldcom (2002), Parmalat (2003), and Lehman 
Brothers (2008). 
 
Whilst corporate governance has long been a focus of policy and political attention, within 
the EU the UKs 1992 Cadbury Report is widely regarded as marking the starting point of 
rapidly accelerating interest in corporate governance. The Cadbury Report had as its 
backdrop a ‘harsh economic climate … [exposing] company reports and accounts to 
unusually close scrutiny’, citing also scandals involving BCCI, Robert Maxwell ‘and the 
controversy over directors’ pay’ Cadbury, 1992, p.9). But this was not limited to the UK. 
‘Since the early 1990s, evidence has been accumulating of significant change in the 
regulation and practice of corporate governance in the nonliberal economies of continental 
Europe’ (Barker, 2010, p. 1). Thus: 
 
over the last years [sic], corporate governance has been the subject of an 
increasingly intense debate. Forty or so corporate governance codes relevant to 
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the European Union have been adopted over the last decade, at national or 
international level, with the aim of better protecting the interests of shareholders 
and/or stakeholders. (Commission of the European Communities, 2003, p. 10, 
emphasis in original). 
 
The EUs corporate governance principles, as set down in the Action Plan, are: 
 
i enhancing corporate governance disclosure 
ii strengthening shareholders’ rights 
iii modernizing the board of directors 
iv co-ordinating corporate governance efforts of member states 
 
Prior to the EU Action Plan, in 1999 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) published its ‘Principles of Corporate Governance’ (OECD, 1999), 
this following the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s. Subsequently, in addition to the 
EU Action Plan, in the US the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in 2003, with the OECD 
revising its principles the following year (OECD, 2004). The EU and OECD principles 
address essentially the same concerns, recognizing that there is no single correct way of 
dealing with corporate governance concerns. One key difference, central to the present 
paper, is that the Action Plan also makes explicit reference to the co-ordination of national 
policy efforts. Moreover, whilst the OECD promotes voluntary approaches, the European 
Commission recognizes the need for a combination of voluntary and legislative approaches 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2003, p. 12) – a difference which reflects the 
legislative powers of these two ‘transnational institutions’ (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2009, p. 381). 
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For the reasons set out above, we focus on the voluntary elements. Moreover, whilst the 
2003 Communication covers a range of policy areas, including (hard) company law, the 
European Commission gave particular attention to non-legislative approaches. This follows 
calls for ‘the European Commission to…come forward with a recommendation for a 
European code of best practice’ (Lannoo, 1999, p. 292; see also van Apeldoorn and Horn, 
2006, p. 18). The European Commission’s soft-law approach was supported also by the 
now-defunct European Corporate Governance Forum (ECGF). It started from the premise 
that there was no need for an EU Code. Rather, it would seek to achieve ‘coordination and 
convergence of national codes’ (Collier, 2007, p. 279). That said, in the context of the OMC, 
even after a few years of operation the ECGF fell ‘far short of a full information exchange, 
nor is there any effective benchmarking or peer review, as yet’ (Deakin, 2009, p. 244). 
 
There is an extensive literature on convergence in corporate governance measures (an 
excellent overview is provided by Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009; see also Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; 2009; Lütz, 2004; Lütz and Eberle, 2008, amongst many). 
Yoshikawa and Rasheed identify three drivers of convergence: financial market integration, 
goods market integration and diffusion of codes and harmonization of accounting rules. The 
first two are particularly important in the EU context – although Yoshikawa and Rasheed do 
not make this specific connection. Moreover, these two drivers are powered by market 
forces, which may lead to a ‘race to the top’ rather than bottom (Deakin, 2009, p. 229), as 
globalization and the free movement of capital create incentives for countries to establish 
policy regimes which reassure and attract foreign investors (see also, inter alia, Enriques and 
Volpin, 2007; Ivaschenko and Koeva Brooks, 2008). 
 
The present paper differs from this literature in one key way. Rather than looking for cross-
country convergence per se, we seek evidence of convergence towards the corporate 
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governance measures identified in the Action Plan. Market forces in general – and the Single 
European Market in particular – may contribute to convergence, but we are interested in the 
extent to which the member states’ decisions have been influenced by the specific content of 
the Action Plan. We thus focus on the extent to which the EU policy debate ‘steers’ member 
states’ actions. Policy and its implementation are negotiated between a ‘government’ and 
partners, including those in the public sector (Stoker, 2000, p. 98). Moreover: 
 
Steering involves government learning a different ‘operating code’ which rests 
less on its authority to make decisions and instead builds on its capacity to create 
the conditions for positive-sum partnerships and setting or changing the rules of 
the game to encourage what are perceived as beneficial outcomes. Governments, 
the advocates of steering suggest, can establish a framework for effective 
collective action and seek to guide that action towards ‘desirable’ goals and away 
from ‘undesirable’ goals. 
 
If we replace ‘government’ with ‘the EU’, we argue that this conception of steering captures 
the essence of the OMC. In the negotiations between ‘government’ and public sector 
partners (member state governments) we see guidance emerge, such as in the Action Plan. 
That said, in the multi-level governance setting of the EU (see, inter alia, Stephenson, 2013), 
we can also observe that whilst the European Commission is helping to set the initial agenda 
for debate, the participation of the member states means they are helping to steer themselves 
and each other towards common goals (see also Bache, 2012, p. 632). Thus a combination of 
steering and cajoling, through the OMC, serves an important role in encouraging member 
states to take policy decisions in a given area, in a reasonable timeframe. This accords with 
Deakin’s (2009) view of the OMC as an example of reflexive governance. 
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The limited literature that has thus far looked at the convergence of EU member states’ 
corporate governance codes finds some supporting evidence. This stands in contrast to the 
prediction of Cernat (2004, p. 161), who believed differences across EU countries would 
continue because EU decision-making was ‘poorly equipped’ to advance convergence. 
 
Cromme (2005, p. 363) saw a ‘high degree of agreement’ across the (then) 47 corporate 
governance codes in Europe, ‘even though company law in the individual member states 
continues to be characterized by significant differences.’ Cicon et al. (2012) analyze codes 
from 23 (mainly EU) countries. They too find some evidence of convergence, but they seek 
evidence of convergence per se, rather than towards the defined set of codes in the Action 
Plan. Similar to Cromme, they find a growing divergence of code content from national legal 
context. In addition, they find that the code issuer has an important impact on code content. 
We thus include this variable in our analysis, below. 
 
Hermes et al. (2006) do look at convergence towards the criteria laid down in the Action 
Plan, and find that domestic codes are ‘not in full accordance’ (page 280) with it. Two 
limitations of their study, however, are that it was undertaken quite soon after the publication 
of the Action Plan; and they omit some countries that we are now able to include. 
Ivaschenko and Koeva Brooks (2008, p. 1) look for evidence of convergence, focusing 
narrowly on ‘the dynamics of the voting premiums, a measure of the private benefits of 
control in a corporation’. They find evidence of convergence – and they find that countries 
which pursued national as well as EU reform initiatives produced ‘higher and longer lasting 
benefits’. Mavrommati and Papathanassiou (2006) are, to the best of our knowledge, the 
only authors who have studied EU corporate governance policy with explicit reference to the 
OMC. They do not, however, analyse formally whether this has delivered policy 
convergence. 
  12 
 
Certain features thus emerge from the literature that we seek to develop in the present study. 
Ambiguities exist over the extent of convergence in EU member states’ corporate 
governance codes. This, in turn, raises questions about the extent to which soft law 
approaches can deliver policy convergence. Importantly, the above studies analyzing EU 
policy typically make no distinction between hard law and soft law. In the following 
sections, by utilizing a wider range of statistical tests, a larger dataset, and a longer 
timeframe, we seek to enhance understanding of whether the voluntary soft-law approach 
has delivered convergence in EU member states’ corporate governance codes – and whether 
it has done so around the policy indicators set out in the 2003 Action Plan. 
 
II. Data Description and Research Design 
The Action Plan does not seek agreement on a single EU corporate governance code but, 
rather, to work towards ‘a certain co-ordination of corporate governance codes in the EU…to 
encourage further convergence and the exchange of best practice.’ (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2003, pp. 11-12; see also Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008, p. 2). That said, 
the Action Plan set out multiple individual priorities, towards which member states’ 
measures should converge. The four over-arching principles of the Action Plan are set out 
earlier. The first three are sub-divided into 26 specific priorities. These have then been used 
as the basis for the content analysis of national policy responses – see below. In effect, this 
research seeks to determine the extent to which, as a result, the fourth principle in the Action 
Plan, ‘co-ordinating corporate governance efforts of member states’, has been achieved. 
 
Our primary dataset is derived from a content analysis of 95 separate corporate governance 
codes and principles issued in EU member states, from the beginning of 1992 to the middle 
of 2010. The main source has been the website of the European Corporate Governance 
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Institute (ECGI, 2010) which maintains a database of the full texts of international corporate 
governance codes and guidelines (the complete list of the 95 national documents is available 
from the authors on request). In addition to corporate governance documents classed 
officially as ‘codes’, those listing corporate governance principles and recommendations are 
also included, because such documents include best practices of corporate governance, 
information relevant to the OMC. 
 
Aside from hard-law instruments, we also exclude draft codes, and codes which focus on a 
narrow issue (e.g. the role of pension funds as shareholders in publicly traded companies; 
non-executive directors) or a specific type of organization (e.g. non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), pension funds, government departments). The main reason is that 
these codes have limited scope and are precluded from even potentially addressing all 
priorities. Their inclusion could, therefore, bias the results. Thus, for example, whilst Ireland 
has published documents relating to corporate governance, they have been excluded from 
our analysis: IAIM (1999) focuses on share option schemes; CGAI (2008) relates 
specifically to the development NGO sector; and CGAI (2010) deals with independent 
directors of Investment Funds (see also Hermes et al., 2006). 
 
Of the 95 codes issued, 36 were published before 2003 and the EU Action Plan, of which 20 
were the issuing countries’ first codes. The majority of codes were therefore issued after the 
Action Plan was published. We also see that as first code issuance falls away, the number of 
revisions rises and remains high for several years (once started, countries continued to 
engage with corporate governance questions). Because the sample period finishes in the 
middle of 2010, the number of codes analyzed for that year is not comparable with previous 
years. These data are summarised in Appendix Figure 1 of the Online Appendix (see also 
Table 1). 
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The first code came in the UK with the Cadbury Report (Cadbury, 1992). The jump in code 
issuance seen in 1998, is mainly early-adopters revising existing codes. This revision process 
continues in subsequent years, but there is a jump in the number of countries establishing 
first codes in 1999, the year the OECD first published its principles. 2003 sees a new peak in 
the number of revisions issued, with only Finland and Lithuania issuing first codes. Between 
2004 and 2007, five countries issue their first codes. Four are from central and eastern 
European (CEE) countries. The fifth is Luxembourg, by some way the last western member 
state to adopt a code (and a country described by Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009, p. 408, as 
an offshore financial centre, alongside Bermuda and the Cayman Islands). 
 
2008 sees a peak in the number of revisions, which may indicate an initial response from 
member states to one perceived cause of the economic crisis. Over the data period, the code 
amended the most times was the 2002 German Corporate Governance Code, The Cromme 
Code, although these revisions did not introduce significant changes in policy coverage, in 
the context of the Action Plan. Following Cicon et al. (2012), as noted earlier, we also 
distinguish between the type of code issuer. Of the 95 codes, 32 per cent had a stock 
exchange issuer, 25 per cent a government issuer (national legislature or government 
commission), 25 per cent an industry or trade association issuer, and 18 per cent a composite 
issuer, with representatives from at least two of the individual issues types.2 
 
III. Quantitative Analysis of Member States’ Codes 
                                                          
2 The present study does not classify every code issuer in the same way as Cicon et al.. For example Sweden’s 
2007 code was issued by the Swedish Corporate Governance Board and is classified by Cicon et al. as having 
an industry issuer. Its development involved two stages, including a group appointed by the Government, thus 
we have classified this as a composite issuer. 
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To enable the quantitative analysis of member states’ codes, content analysis has been used 
(Singh et al., 2005; Werder et al., 2005. The contents of the 95 corporate governance 
documents have been analyzed to determine whether or not they include each of the 26 
corporate governance priorities identified from the Action Plan. The 26 priorities are 
summarised in Appendix Table 1 of the Online Appendix. A binary score has been applied – 
1 if the priority is present, 0 otherwise. We do not adopt a range of zero to one, to avoid 
subjective evaluations (Giner, 1995). The values obtained for each corporate governance 
principle are then aggregated and converted to a percentage, to construct a ‘Coverage Index’. 
This Index shows the percentage of priorities from the Action Plan contained in each 
national document. 
 
In order to test for convergence in the coverage of EU priorities in national codes, we have 
applied the measures used by Starke et al. (2008). Regarding sigma-convergence (Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin, 1992), which refers to a reduction in the dispersion at a particular point in 
time, the measures used have been the range, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation. 
The Levene test (1960) for equality of variances in different groups, is used to assess the 
statistical significance of homogeneity of variance over time. With respect to beta-
convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995), which occurs when the growth rate is higher 
in countries with lower starting levels, we use the catch-up measure utilized by Starke et al. 
(2008), i.e. the simple correlation between the starting value and the subsequent growth rate 
(or change) for the period of interest, using Pearson’s r statistic. 
 
Table 1 presents Coverage Index statistics by country and by year. Most commonly, the 
Index in a country is stable or increases over time. The former does not mean that a code 
does not introduce new information but, rather, that there is no change with respect to the 
Action Plan policy priorities. In some cases, the Index falls or fluctuates. One explanation, 
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relevant to Finland, France and Greece, is that later codes were issued by industry or trade 
organization, with narrower corporate governance interests than a government. Another 
factor is that in, notably, Luxemburg, Spain and Sweden, some aspects of corporate 
governance are now addressed via legislation. Such a move would complement, for example, 
EU Directives on the harmonization of transparency requirements, in relation to information 
about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market; and on the 
exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies.3 
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
Focusing on sigma-convergence between countries, statistical measures of dispersion by 
year are displayed in Table 1. This shows a significant rise in the mean Index over 1996 to 
2004, for reasons outlined earlier. Another rise, from 2007 to 2008, marks the beginning of 
the global economic crisis. The trend in the standard deviation is more or less flat, whilst the 
range falls dramatically in 2002; and, from 2005, exhibits smaller fluctuations. The 
coefficient of variation exhibits volatility but, from 2002, at a much lower level, mirroring 
the rise in the mean. This indicates modest convergence across national codes. 
 
Regarding beta-convergence, the negative sign of the catch-up measure (-0.45, in Table 1) 
shows that national codes with a lower initial Coverage Index have seen the Index grow 
more rapidly than national codes with a higher initial Index. This suggests that those 
countries whose codes initially did not align much with the EU priorities, have responded to 
                                                          
3 See, respectively, Directive 2004/109/EC, published in the Official Journal of the European Union, L390, 
31.12.2004, pages 38-57; and Directive 2007/36/EC, published in the Official Journal of the European Union, 
L184, 14.07.2007, pages 17-24. 
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this in subsequent revisions, resulting in the convergence between countries’ codes seen over 
the period to 2010. 
 
III.1 Codes Published Before and After the Action Plan 
To explore this last finding further, we distinguish between countries whose first codes were 
published before and after the Action Plan (for which detailed statistics are presented in 
Appendix Table 2 of the Online Appendix). In most countries the Coverage Index for the last 
code is higher than the first code. Indeed, comparing first and last codes, we see that the 
mean is significantly higher, the coefficient of variation lower for the group of last codes 
than first code, the standard deviation is not significantly different between each group, and 
the range is higher. That said, this latter finding is explained by the very low Index score for 
the second (2001) Greek code, published before the Action Plan. 
 
Five countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg, and Slovenia) published their first 
code after the publication of the Action Plan. For three of these countries, the Index score is 
higher than the mean for all countries’ first codes, with Estonia’s only marginally below. 
This indicates that these late adopters introduced first codes that were much more in line 
with the Action Plan than the first codes of the early adopters of corporate governance 
principles. 
 
Consistent with this, codes published before the Action Plan have a lower Index than codes 
published after. In the former group there is also less convergence than the latter group, 
shown by the higher range and coefficient of variation of the Index. The standard deviations 
for the two groups of codes, however, are not statistically significantly different from each 
other. It is important to note in interpreting these results that the group of codes published 
before the Action Plan includes the majority of countries’ first codes. Thus whilst the 
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corporate governance policies of late adopters began life with a strong alignment to the 
principles in the Action Plan, early adopters subsequently adapted their policies iteratively 
towards those principles. 
 
III.2 Western Versus Central and Eastern EU Countries’ Codes 
This last point above may possibly be explained by differences between old and new 
member states. We therefore follow Hermes et al. (2006), and consider the differences that 
may exist between western European4 and CEE5 countries. Appendix Figure 2 picks out key 
information from Table 1, showing the date of publication of each country’s first code but 
with western and CEE countries distinguished. This shows that, other than the UK, Bulgaria 
and possibly Estonia, there is a strong trend identifiable – that, on average, first codes 
published later have higher Indexes. This trend is particularly strong for the western 
countries. When looked at in isolation, there is a much less clear pattern evident amongst the 
CEE. That said, six of the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and produced their first code 
before or in 2004, have a much higher Index in those first codes than was the case with the 
western countries, a feature that also helps explain the positive trend overall. 
 
Considering the codes by Action Plan priority, important differences exist between western 
and CEE countries. We find evidence that for the measures ‘enhance corporate governance 
disclosure’ and ‘strengthen shareholder rights’, the codes issued in the CEE countries had a 
considerably higher Index than those from western countries. The reverse is true for 
‘modernizing the board of directors’. This result is consistent with the findings of Hermes et 
al. (2006). 
                                                          
4 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, The 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. 
5 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
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A possible explanation for these differences could be the timing of the first publication of 
codes by country. For first CEE codes published even before the Action Plan, learning may 
be taking place vis a vis existing western countries’ codes. For example, Romania’s first 
code was published in 2000, before the Action Plan but after publication of the OECD 
principles, and after 13 codes, including 7 first codes, had been published in western 
countries. The corollary of this is that we see, relatively, much larger increases in the Index 
for the codes of the western European countries after the Action Plan is published. Further 
details are provided in Appendix Table 3. 
 
III.3 Multivariate Analysis 
The foregoing analysis reveals several possible reasons that could explain the evolution of 
the Coverage Index between codes and over time. To analyze how these variables might 
impact on the evolution of the Index we undertake further, multivariate, quantitative analysis 
















The dependent variable is the Coverage Index. As the foregoing analysis has shown, relevant 
factors to include as independent variables are: whether the country is western or CEE 
(‘Western’ dichotomous variable); whether the code was published before or after the Action 
Plan (‘After AP’ dichotomous variable); and whether the Action Plan had the same influence 
on the codes from western or CEE countries (‘After AP*Western’ interaction variable). In 
addition, other variables that could affect the Coverage Index have been included as control 
variables. We include variables relating to the type of issuer, expressed with respect to 
Eq. (1) 
  20 
Government Issuer (‘ExchangeIssuer’, ‘IndustryIssuer’, and ‘CompositeIssuer’); the number 
of codes issued in a specific country (‘Nrevision’ variable); and the order of code issued in 
the EU context (‘Order’ variable). Because the codes in the study include documents codes 
and principles, we include the variable ‘Code’ to control for this. 
 
Equation 1 is estimated taking into account the possible relationship between codes issued in 
the same country, as they have a common history, culture and legal system. To relax the 
assumption that the observations are independent, the estimation clusters the data by 
countries. Table 2 presents our results. Consistent with our earlier findings, the Index is 
larger for codes issued by CEE than by western countries. There are not, however, 
significant differences between CEE Indexes published before or after the Action Plan. 
These results together suggest, first, that the CEE codes reflected what was already being 
addressed across the OECD and individual western countries’ codes; but also that, second, 
the Action Plan arguably reflected the range of concerns covered by those individual codes, 
drawing a diverse set of emerging priorities into a single document. It is also interesting to 
note that, after the publication of the Action Plan, the codes of the western countries overall 
became more consistent with the Action Plan’s priorities than those issued from CEE 
countries. Codes issued by a government commission align more closely to the priorities of 
the Action Plan than those issued by an industry association or national stock exchange. 
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
Table 2 also repeats the multivariate analysis using, as the dependent variable, each topic of 
the Coverage Index: enhancing corporate governance disclosure, strengthening shareholder 
rights, and modernizing the board of directors. It shows that issuer-type is a significant 
variable, affecting the level of the Coverage Index regardless of the topic analyzed. 
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IV Conclusions 
Europeanization describes the impacts of EU membership on both the processes by which 
EU policy-making manifests itself at the national level, and the policy outcomes of those 
processes. Most of the literature on Europeanization has thus far focused on hard law 
processes and policies. The purpose of this paper has been to explore empirically whether 
soft law processes also have an impact on national policy-making. We have utilized a unique 
dataset on national corporate governance policy measures introduced at the national level, 
derived from a content analysis of 95 national documents issued between 1992 and (mid) 
2010. In contrast to the extant literature on convergence in corporate governance regimes, 
our focus is not on convergence per se, but on whether EU member states’ policies have 
converged towards a series of corporate governance policy priorities issued by the European 
Commission in 2003 – what we have referred to in this paper as the Action Plan. 
 
In this analysis, we have employed a range of quantitative tests to determine whether 
convergence has taken place. These have provided the following answers to our research 
questions. There is clear evidence that the Action Plan has influenced member states’ 
domestic corporate governance regimes. Early adopters of codes did so in response to 
multiple corporate governance concerns, with later revisions seeing national corporate 
governance regimes align more specifically on the contents of the Action Plan. Later 
adopters – principally but not exclusively the new member states – tended to establish 
national corporate governance regimes more in line with the Action Plan ab initio. 
 
That said, we also find evidence that the old member states took their code revisions further, 
so that by 2010 their policy regimes had, on average, moved more in line with the new 
member states. This also suggests that, whilst some countries issued codes at a time (before 
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2003) when they were being guided by the initial OECD principles, policy revisions were 
ongoing, with measures converging progressively on those principles in the Action Plan. We 
also find evidence that code issuer has a significant impact on the nature of the policies put 
in place. 
 
As we might expect a priori, given the nature of EU soft law processes, member states were 
influenced more by the Action Plan than were industry or stock exchange code-issuers, seen 
in government-issued codes being more closely aligned with the principles of the Action 
Plan than codes issued by other bodies. Moreover, this result might appear contrary to some 
of the Europeanization literature, which finds that in general, bottom-up developments get 
more ‘buy-in’ from non-state actors. In the present case, however, our findings are most 
likely explain by the greater breadth of state than non-state corporate governance codes. 
 
This paper has thus provided important contributions to the existing literatures on 
Europeanization, policy convergence and corporate governance. We have analyzed whether 
soft-law processes in the EU can deliver policy convergence and found that they can. We 
have also made a novel contribution to the literature on convergence in national corporate 
governance regimes, by analyzing whether convergence has taken place towards a pre-
determined set of corporate governance policy principles, rather than whether convergence 
per se has occurred. Again, we have found that it has. 
 
The limitations of the present study suggest potential directions for future research. First, the 
empirical study is confined deliberately to a period which allows it to focus on the influence 
of the 2003 Action Plan on member states’ corporate governance policies. Subsequent 
research could extend and test our results against recent EU policy developments (European 
Commission 2011; 2012). Second, this study is focused on soft law processes. Future 
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research could complement this study by exploring the discussion process between hard-law 
regulations and directives, and soft-law elements of policy. Another limitation concerns the 
unit of analysis used in this study, i.e., the relationship between national policy and the EU-
level. An important area for further research is to extend this study by including company-
level data (building on, for example, Wójcik, 2006; Verga Matos and Faustino, 2012), in 
particular to analyze how EU soft-law processes affect corporate governance in transnational 
companies. 
 
In sum, this study offers insights about EU soft law process, exploring the impact of the 
2003 Corporate Governance Action Plan on national corporate governance codes, and opens 
a broad range of interesting research questions for further exploration of corporate 
governance and the dynamics of corporate governance convergence across the EU. 
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Table 2: Multivariate Analysis of Factors Influencing the Coverage Index 
Explanatory variables 
 Regression by Topics of Coverage Index 
Coverage Index  Disclosure  Shareholders’ right  Board of Directors  
Western -.18**    (.05) -.32**   (.09) -.14
†      (.07) -.09†    (.05) 
After_AP -.03      (.05) -.14     (.08) .06       (.07) .01     (.07) 
After_AP* Western .11**     (.05)  .25**    (.08) -.005    (.07) .06     (.06) 
Exchange Issuer       -.17**   (.04)       -.20*    (.09)     -.20**   (.06)   -.13*    (.05) 
Industry Issuer   -.17**   (.03) -.18*    (.08) -.25**   (.08) -.12**  (.03) 
Composite Issuer -.05      (.05) -.04     (.11) -.008    (.01) -.08    (.05) 
Order .00       (.00) .00
†       (.00) .00†       (.00) .00     (.00) 
N Revision -.00      (.01) -.03     (.02) -.003    (.02) .02**   (.01) 
Code -.01      (.03) -.02     (.05) -.07      (.05) .01     (.03) 
Constant  .52**     (.08)  .55**    (.13)  .66**    (.07) .43**   (.06) 
F9, 25  12.14**  9.92**  10.49**  15.84** 
R2  0.53  0.37  0.35  0.41 
This table presents the results of the regression of Coverage Index in the second column and the topics of the Coverage 
Index in next three columns: using OLS, with Standard Errors adjusted for 26 clusters in country. Standard errors are in 
brackets. Number of observations is equal to 95. † p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01. 
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Table 1: Coverage Index, by Country, Year and Issuer Type 
 YEAR 
EU MEMBER STATE  1992 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
WESTERN  MEMBERS 
Austria          34.62%m   34.62%m 42.31%m 46.15%m  53.85%m  
Belgium   
    
11.54%t1 
     54%m     61.54%m  
11.54%m 
Cyprus          34.62%s 34.62%s   34.62%s     
Denmark  




Finland          50.00%m     42.31%t   
France 





      
3.85%t 
30.77%g 42.31%g 46.15%g  53.85%g 53.85%g 53.85%g 53.85%g 53.85%g  
30.77%g 
Greece      34.62%g  7.69%          
Italy      7.69%s   19.23%s  34.62%t  26.92%s     
Luxembourg             57.69%s   50.00%s  
Malta        30.77%s    34.62%g      
Portugal      19.23%s    15.38%s   38.46%t 26.92%s   38.46%s 
Spain   7.69%t  26.92%g     61.54%g 46.15%t  38.46%g     
Sweden        30.77%t   46.15%m   38.46%m 30.77%m 26.92%m  
The Netherlands    11.54%g      53.85%g     57.69%g   
United Kingdom 34.62%g    34.62%g  38.46%g   53.85%g   57.69%g  57.69%g  61.54%g 
CEE MEMBERS 
Bulgaria              23.08%s    
Czech Republic        61.54%m   76.92%m       
Estonia             30.77%s     
Hungary         42.31%s     46.15%s 50.00%s   
Latvia            38.46%s      
Lithuania          42.31%s        
Poland 
        
38.46%t 
 23.08%t   30.77%s    
23.08%t 
Romania       23.08%t         26.92%s  
Slovakia         50.00%s      69.23%t   
Slovenia           53.85%s 57.69%m  57.69%m    
 
OECD      38.46%     57.69%       
                   
MEAN 34.62% 15.38% 7.69% 11.54% 24.04% 25.38% 24.52% 32.69% 35.58% 42.69% 47.86% 42.31% 42.31% 40.38% 48.08% 45.51% 47.12% 
MAX 34.62% 15.38% 7.69% 11.54% 34.62% 34.62% 38.46% 61.54% 50.00% 61.54% 76.92% 57.69% 57.69% 57.69% 69.23% 61.54% 61.54% 
MIN 34.62% 15.38% 7.69% 11.54% 11.54% 7.69% 17.31% 7.69% 19.23% 15.38% 23.08% 34.62% 26.92% 23.08% 30.77% 26.92% 38.46% 
Range (MAX-MIN) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 23.08% 26.92% 21.15% 53.85% 30.77% 46.15% 53.85% 23.08% 30.77% 34.62% 38.46% 34.62% 23.08% 
Standard Deviation     0.10 0.12 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.10 
Coefficient of Variation         0.40 0.49 0.39 0.52 0.26 0.31 0.32 0.25 0.27 0.31 0.27 0.33 0.21 
Catch-up in Total. r= -0.4583, p<0.01.                 
Notes: g: code-issuer is a government institution (national legislature or government commission); t: code-issuer is an industry or trade association; s: code-issuer is a stock exchange; m: the code is issued by a group that contains 
representatives from at least two of the other groups. 
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Online Appendix for: 
Europeanization and the Soft-Law Process of EU Corporate Governance: how has the 
2003 Action Plan impacted on national corporate governance codes? 
 
 
Appendix Figure 1: Issue Dates for First Codes and Revisions 
Note: Because the sample period finishes in the middle of 2010, the number of codes analyzed for that year is not 
comparable with previous years. 
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Appendix Figure 2: Coverage Index of First Codes, by Country 
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Appendix Table 1: Corporate Governance Priorities in the Action Plan 
 
Priority code - Definition of EU corporate governance priorities 
 
Topic 1 - Enhancing corporate governance disclosure 
Annual Corporate Governance Statement (ACGS) 
1.1. To include a description of the operations of the shareholder meeting and its key 
powers in the ACGS. 
1.2. To include a description of shareholder rights and how they can be exercised in the 
ACGS. 
1.3. To include the composition and operation of the board and its committees in the 
ACGS. 
1.4. To include the shareholders holding major holdings, and their voting and control rights, 
as well as key agreements in the ACGS. 
1.5. To include any direct and indirect relationships between major shareholders and the 
company in the ACGS. 
1.6. To include the existence and nature of a risk management system in the ACGS. 
1.7. To include reference to a code on corporate governance with which the company 
complies, or in relation to which it explains deviations, in the ACGS. 
Information about the role played by institutional investors 
1.8. To disclose their investment policy and their policy with respect to the exercise of 
voting rights in companies in which they invest. 
1.9. To disclose to their beneficial holders at their request how these rights have been used 
in a particular case. 
 
Topic 2 - Strengthening shareholders’ rights 
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Access to information 
2.1. Access to relevant information before the General Meeting. 
 Other shareholders’ rights 
2.2. Right to ask questions, to vote in absentia or to participate in general meetings via 
electronic means. 
2.3. Provisions for cross-border participation in the General Meeting. 
Shareholder democracy 
2.4. The development of mechanisms to make sure that these existing rights can be 
exercised. 
2.5. Principle of proportionality between capital and control (one share / one vote 
principle). 
 
Topic 3 - Modernising the board of directors 
Board composition 
3.1. In areas where executive directors have conflicts of interests (remuneration, nomination 
or audit issues) decisions should be made exclusively by non-executive directors or 
supervisory directors who are in the majority independent. 
3.2. Particular attention paid to the issue of the number of mandates that may be held 
concurrently. 
3.3. To define the term “independence of directors”. 
3.4. Special emphasis on the audit committee, with a view to fostering the key role it should 
play in supervising the audit function. 
Directors’ remuneration 
3.5. Disclosure of remuneration policy in the annual accounts. 
3.6. Disclosure of detail of remuneration of individual directors in the annual accounts. 
3.7. Prior approval by the shareholder meeting of share and share option schemes in which 
  35 
directors participate. 
3.8. Proper recognition in the annual accounts of the costs of such schemes for the 
company. 
(NOTE: Special emphasis on the cost of variable remuneration schemes, not just the disclosure of detail 
of remuneration) 
Directors’ responsibilities 
3.9. To enhance the “collective responsibility” of all board members for financial and key 
non-financial statements. 
(NOTE: Not just the responsibility of the directors) 
3.10. Introduction of a special investigation right, whereby shareholders holding a certain 
percentage of the share capital should have the right to ask a court or administrative 
authority to authorize a special investigation into the affairs of the company. 
3.11. Development of a wrongful trading rule, whereby directors would be held personally 
accountable for the consequences of the company’s failure. 
3.12. Imposition of directors’ disqualification across the EU as a sanction for misleading 
financial and non-financial statements and other forms of misconduct by directors. 
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Appendix Table 2: Coverage Index Statistics 
 
Coverage Index on codes published 
before and after the Action Plan 
Coverage Index of the first and the last 
code published by each countrya 
 Before After First Last 
Number of 
codes/principles 
36 59 26 26 
Mean 28.95% 43.61% 31.29% 43.20% 
t-testb t=-5.04** (p-value:0.00) t=-15.55** (p-value:0.00) 
K-S testc D = 0.40** (p-value: 0.001) D = 0.33 (p-value: 0.10) 
Max 61.54% 76.92% 76.92% 61.54% 
Min 3.85% 15.38% 7.69% 7.69% 
Range (Max-Min) 57.69% 61.54% 69.23% 53.85% 
Std Deviation 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.15 
Levene Testd F = 1.32 (p-value: 0.35) F = 0.93 (p-value: 0.86)  
Coeff. of Variation 0.50 0.29 0.37 0.49 
Catch-up  r= -0.55** (p-value: 0.003) 
† p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01 
a: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania each published only one code. 
b: The t-test is a parametric test, which assumes that the data are independently sampled from a normal 
distribution, that determines if there is a significant difference between the means of two data sets. The null 
hypothesis indicates that the mean of group one equals the mean of group two. The results show that we can 
reject this hypothesis at p-value=0.01. 
c: The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is a non-parametric test on the equality of distributions. The null hypothesis 
is that the two-samples are drawn from the same distribution. The results show that we can reject this 
hypothesis at p-value=0.10. 
d: The Levene Test (1960) 6 is a statistic used to assess the equality of variances in different samples, which 
does not require normality of the underlying data. The null hypothesis is that the variances of both samples are 
equal. The results show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
 
                                                          
6 Levene H. (1960) ‘Robust tests for equality of variance.’ In Olkin, I., Ghurye, S.G., Hoeffding, W., Madow, W.G. and Mann, H.B. (eds) 
Contributions to probability and statistics (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press), pp. 278-91. 
